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We are attracted by our heart's desires. In love we pas-
sionately desire to possess the good, or at least what we per-
ceive to be the good. But what we seek soon comes to pos-
sess us in thought, feeling, and action. It becomes who we 
are, the content of our character. In this paper I want to talk 
about education and Eros. I want to talk about Eros as a 
creative poetic force that makes new meanings and makes us 
who we are. I desire to reopen a conversation about what it 
means to educate for wisdom, that is, to teach the passions to 
desire the good. 
The field of education would be better off if it would 
turn to a more robust philosophy of everyday life that em-
phasizes the emotions, the imagination, and disciplined moral 
action. Such an education is largely creative and aesthetic. 
It is precisely the kind of education that Dewey's philosophy 
of Eros seems to make possible. We will begin with philoso-
phy or the love of wisdom. 
Dewey understood wisdom as follows: 
By wisdom we mean not systematic and proved knowledge of 
fact and truth, but a conviction about moral values, a sense for 
the better kind of life to be led. Wisdom is a moral term, and 
like every moral term refers not to the constitution of things 
already in existence, not even if that constitution be magnified 
into eternity and absoluteness. As a moral term it refers to a 
choice about something to be done, a preference for living this 
sort of life rather than that. It refers not to accomplished real-
ity but to a desired future which our desires, when translated 
into articulate conviction, may help bring into existence.' 
Wisdom desires the best, has the aesthetic power to imagine 
the possible in the actual situation, and has the discipline to 
achieve it in action. Such wisdom lies beyond knowledge of 
actual facts. 
In expressing his own view of the meaning of philoso-
phy, Dewey decried Plato's ideal of wisdom as knowledge of 
the eternal, the transcendental, or "the Good." He proposed 
an alternative to any affirmation of philosophy as epistemo-
logically foundational and transcendentally metaphysical. 
The alternative was, 
. . . to deny that philosophy is in any sense whatever a form of 
knowledge. It is to say that we should return to the original 
and etymological sense of the word, and recognize that phi-
losophy is a form of desire, of effort at action — a love, namely, 
of wisdom; but with the thorough proviso, not attached to the 
Platonic use of the word, that wisdom, whatever it is, is not a 
mode of science or knowledge.. . it is an intellectualized wish, 
an aspiration subjected to rational discriminations and tests, a 
social hope reduced to a working program of action, a proph-
ecy of the future, but one disciplined by serious thought and 
knowledge.^ 
Philosophy, the love of wisdom, lies far beyond knowledge 
and the quest for certainty. Wisdom is what is possessed by 
prophets and prophetic teachers that allows them to create 
new social values. 
Chapter 2 of Dewey's Art as Experience is titled "The 
Live Creature and 'Ethereal Things'."3 Exploring this title 
carefully will help explain the core of Dewey' s thinking about 
the relations between Eros, action, and rationality. It will 
also help clarify his thinking in ways that will greatly sur-
prise those who read Dewey as scientistic. Thomas Alexander 
believes that we should approach Dewey through his aes-
thetics. Dewey believed all human beings desired to live life 
with the greatest sense of meaning and value. Alexander calls 
this passionate desire for life, meaning, and value "the Hu-
man Eros."4 A passionate desire to live and satisfy need is 
something we share with every living creature. Unique to 
the Human Eros is the passionate need and creative desire 
for what Dewey called "Ethereal things." 
Before taking up Dewey's notion of "Ethereal Things," 
and the pragmatic view of creation it contains, I would like 
to dismiss the accusation that Dewey's pragmatism is 
scientistic. This dismissal helps warrant Alexander's sug-
gestion that Dewey is best approached through his aesthetic 
rather than his logical and scientific side. In "The Live Crea-
ture and 'Ethereal Things'," Dewey boldly stated, "science 
itself is but a central art auxiliary to the generation and utili-
zation of other arts."5 Scientific inquiry was a creative activ-
ity for Dewey and truths, i.e., "warranted assertions," were 
artifacts produced by the process. The warranted assertions 
could then be used to help make more cognitive, moral, and 
aesthetic meanings. Furthermore, science itself was a cul-
tural artifact, a tool or instrument for making more meaning. 
In explaining the second part of his title "Ethereal 
Things," Dewey acknowledged that he "took the liberty of 
borrowing from Keats the word 'ethereal' to designate the 
meanings and values that many philosophers and some crit-
ics suppose are inaccessible to sense, because of their spiri-
tual, eternal and universal characters — thus exemplifying 
the common dualism of nature and spirit."6 Dewey's natu-
ralism put the wonder of existence and the miracle of cre-
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ation into daily activities within our contingent, evolving and 
unfinished world. 
Dewey provides the passage from the poet Keats that 
contributed to his chapter title. It recommends that the artist 
should gaze "upon the Sun, the Moon, the Stars, and the Earth 
and its contents as material to form greater things, that is 
ethereal things — greater things than the Creator himself 
made."7 For Dewey humanity was a participant in an unfin-
ished universe rather than a spectator of a finished one. In 
order to survive and exalt our existence, we must creatively 
solve our problems and evolve life-affirming values, perhaps 
of the kind that never before existed. The original solutions 
to such problems and the genesis of genuine values are al-
ways creative. In this way the creation continues to be cre-
ative and in our acts of creation we find what is most godlike 
within ourselves, that is, the passion and power of original 
creation and reconstruction—the passion that at least we share 
with other living creatures. 
Dewey makes much of the fact that Keats "identified the 
attitude of the artist with that of the live creature."8 Dewey 
refers us to a passage from Keats that begins with remarks on 
the commonalities between the love-making and home-mak-
ing habits of hawks and humans. It concludes with Keats's 
observation, "I go out among the Fields and catch a glimpse 
of a Stoat or a fieldmouse hurrying along — to what? The 
creature has a purpose and his eyes are bright with it. I go 
amongst the buildings of the city and see a man hurrying 
along — at what? The creature has a purpose and his eyes 
are bright with it. . . ."9 The live creature is filled with pas-
sionate desire and its actions are gliding, agile, and attuned 
to its purpose. 
Dewey is quick to follow Keats in drawing a remarkable 
conclusion from the above analogy. Human action may be 
guided by its goal, its purposes, and it may achieve that which 
it values; yet, as Dewey and Keats saw it, "There may be 
reasonings, but when they take an instinctive form, like that 
of animal forms and movements, they are poetry, they are 
fine; they have grace."10 The passions of the hawk, the 
strivings of the fieldmouse, and "the Human Eros" all pas-
sionately and with a beguiling power, strive for the happi-
ness that the good promises. The supreme power of human 
passion lies in its capacity of attaching itself to "ethereal 
things" and thereby acquiring foresight and a greater capac-
ity to engage in reasoning in order to realize its longings. 
Ethereal things are values, the Deweyan "ends-in-view" that 
give point and purpose to inquiry. When foresight comes to 
the Human Eros it allows us to conceive of values and mean-
ings that do not even exist in the present time or place. We 
can passionately desire what does not yet exist anywhere. 
Moreover, we can discipline ourselves with reasoning in or-
der to realize our dreams, our ends-in-view. Indeed, logic 
and science themselves are among the things that the Human 
Eros creates, one of the meanings that it makes, so it can 
continue to make more meaning. But where do the mean-
ings and values that we create come from? Plato's answer 
was "the Good;" Christianity's is "God." Keats and Dewey, 
however, answer differently. 
Dewey draws two points from the following passage 
wherein Keats declared, "the simple imaginative Mind may 
have its rewards in the repetitions of its own silent workings 
coming continually on the Spirit with a fine Suddenness."11 
The first point we have already considered. It is the convic-
tion that reasonings "have an origin like that of the move-
ments of a wild creature toward its goal" and in becoming 
instinctive become poetically creative. The second has im-
plications for our understanding of the aims of the education 
of wisdom and of the kind of curriculum required. Dewey 
said, 
. . . no "reasoning," that is, as excluding imagination and sense, 
can reach truth. Even "the greatest philosopher" exercises an 
animal-like preference to guide his (sic) thinking to its conclu-
sions. He selects and puts aside as his imaginative sentiments 
move. "Reason" at its height cannot attain complete grasp and 
a self-contained assurance. It must fall back upon imagination 
— upon the embodiment of ideas in emotionally charged 
12 sense.  ^ 
Imagination gives visions of values, ideals and ideas of things 
that are not anywhere, but that could be here now. Imagina-
tion images possibilities beyond the bounds of the actual. 
Strong poets imagine possibilities with a passion. They de-
sire to possess their imagined ideals. They strive to call "ethe-
real things" into existence. Wise poets rely on reasonings to 
realize their values, but it is hardly a detached and dispas-
sionate logic, although sometimes it is useful to pretend to 
work that way. Value neutrality and detached rationality are 
passions whose very purposes deny their possibility. For 
Dewey and Keats reasonableness was upon the roadway to 
making more meaning, a verb and not a noun, and if we have 
to reconstruct rationality to reach our destination then we 
should do so. 
For Dewey and Keats imagination mediated between 
truth and beauty until they became whole in wisdom. Let us 
see what Dewey meant by this. Dewey begins by reflecting 
on one of Keats' most famous lines: 
Beauty is truth, truth beauty — that is all 
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know.1 3 
Dewey connects this passage to a letter from two years ear-
lier in which Keats wrote — "What Imagination seizes as 
Beauty must be Truth."14 Dewey helps clarify what is hap-
pening here when he observes that in Keats's "tradition, 'truth' 
never signifies correctness of intellectual statements about 
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things, or truth as its meaning is now influenced by science. 
It denotes the wisdom by which men (sic) live, especially 
'the lore of good and evil ' ."1 5 At first this might not seem to 
help much. However, if we remember that nowhere are the 
Hellenistic influences that acted on Keats more evident than 
in his "Ode on a Grecian Urn" which concludes with the two 
famous lines above, then we have a clue. By truth here Keats 
and Dewey were, I suggest, thinking within the Hellenistic 
tradition of aletheia that we translate as "truth." By aletheia 
the ancient Greeks meant the disclosure of something, the 
unconcealment of some being. The closest thing we moderns 
have to such an idea is the often discredited term "Revela-
tion." Beauty is revealed in the work of the artist. The "truth" 
of art, of poetry, is that it can disclose the beauty of meaning-
ful possibilities that are concealed beneath the mask of the 
actual, the ordinary, and the everyday. And this is as true of 
making love, making children, home making, or the making 
of community (statecraft) as it is of sculpting, painting in 
oils, or literary composition. Dewey saw no simple and sharp 
difference between the fine and the practical arts. 
So what releases the possibilities hidden beneath the ac-
tual? The immediate answer is imagination; the mediate an-
swer is wisdom. It is imagination that first images the bare 
possibility, that catches a glimpse of things, meanings and 
values that are not, but that could be. At first such imaginary 
insight into new values can only be vague, inexact, and im-
precise. The beginning of wisdom lies in envisioning ethe-
real things. Or as Dewey put it, "ultimately there are but two 
philosophies. One of them accepts life and experience in all 
its uncertainty, mystery, doubt, and self-knowledge and turns 
that experience upon itself to deepen and intensify its own 
qualities — to imagination and art."16 The other philosophy 
tries to complete the transcendental quest for certain knowl-
edge that removes all mystery and doubt. It will have noth-
ing to do with truly ethereal things, that is "greater things 
than the Creator himself made." But imagination alone will 
not release pent-up possibility. 
To call our imaginary visions of novel values, of ethe-
real things, into existence, we must desire them with all the 
passion of the Human Eros. In this way we deepen and in-
tensify their qualities and render them more stable, secure, 
and usable. We must act if we are to actualize imaginary 
possibilities. What's more, we must act effectively. It is here 
that fine reasonings are required. Wisdom requires imagina-
tion, passionate desire, determined yet intelligent inquiry, and 
action. Even that is not enough, for wisdom also requires 
understanding the difference between good and evil. 
In the very last sub-section of Art and Experience. Dewey 
turned to the relation between art and morality. Dewey be-
lieved in the dictum that "poetry is criticism of life." He did 
not, however, think that the poet that called new things, mean-
ings, and values into existence needed to intend her acts to be 
cultural criticism for them to be effective critiques of society. 
As Dewey put it, "A sense of possibilities that are unrealized 
and that might be realized are, when they are put in contrast 
with actual conditions, the most penetrating 'criticism' of the 
latter that can be made. It is by a sense of possibilities open-
ing before us that we become aware of the constrictions that 
hem us in and of burdens that oppress."17 A lack of imagina-
tion and thereby a sense of possibility is the greatest oppres-
sion there is. It is here that any critical and transformational 
theory of education must take its departure. The actual world 
is in the shape that it is in because those who have power use 
it to mold society according to their often unenlightened and 
selfish interests. It is oppressive power that limits imagina-
tion. It is power that determines the one right answer on the 
machine-graded pencil-and-paper test which, if passed, al-
lows the bearer of the approved seal to exchange their knowl-
edge for power. Otherwise the knowledge would be, for them, 
useless. It is hegemonic power that imagines for us and then 
vends its censored, pre-interpreted, and limited musings to 
us for a price. Without an expansive imagination, one will-
ing to go beyond approved limits, it is impossible to be free. 
More then that, without imagination it is impossible to be 
moral. Morality means the capacity to choose and to be re-
sponsible for what is chosen. Tyranny always wants us to 
have the responsibility without the capacity. It is imagina-
tion, as we will soon see, that takes us beyond good and evil. 
That is why artistic and aesthetic education could be the core 
of the curriculum of public education in a fully functioning 
democracy. First, though, we must add yet another intricacy 
to the idea of what it means to love wisdom. 
Dewey argued that any attribution of the "moral effect" 
of art must take into account " the collective civilization that 
is the context in which works of art are produced and en-
joyed."18 The collective is held together by communication, 
and for Dewey education was crucial; for it was there that the 
cultural legacy was passed on, with or without a sense of the 
immense possibility it contained. Dewey declared: 
It is by way of communication that art becomes the incompa-
rable organ of instruction, but the way is so remote from that 
usually associated with the idea of education, it is a way that 
lifts art so far above what we are accustomed to think of as 
instruction, that we are repelled by any suggestion of teaching 
and learning in connection with art. But our revolt is in fact a 
reflection upon education that proceeds by methods so literal 
as to exclude the imagination and one not touching the desires 
and emotions of men (sic).19 
An education that touched the desires and emotions of women 
and men would be one that educated Eros in the ways of 
wisdom. Such an education needs to include the imagination 
as well as the discipline of devoted reasonings and deeds. 
But it also needs to include a sense of community and careful 
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communication. Dewey felt "that poetry teaches as friends 
and life teach, by being, and not by express intent."20 The 
best teachers are those who be wise and do what wise women 
and men do. 
Thomas Alexander declares, "Dewey asserts the primacy 
of the aesthetic encounter as the paradigm for grasping the 
possibilities of existence. Through the aesthetic, we grasp 
the significance of the imagination as the transformation of 
the world through action. The ontological dimensions of the 
creative are the intertwining of the actual with the possible 
and this is the context in which action makes sense."21 I 
recommend the poetic sense of life as the paradigm for the 
education of what Alexander calls "the Human Eros." It is of 
course the education of wisdom offered in Dewey's 
Democracy and Education. It is a poetic education. 
"Imagination is the chief instrument of the good," Dewey 
stated, "hence it is that art is more moral than moralities... . 
The moral prophets of humanity have always been poets even 
though they spoke in free verse or by p a r a b l e . " D e w e y 
preferred moral prophets to Plato's scientific philosopher 
kings as inspirers of social hope. The difference is between 
Plato's ideal of a static society constructed according to 
timeless laws, and Dewey's Darwinian vision of a state 
constantly reconstructing itself and, hopefully, progressing. 
Prophets are commonly social critics, but even when they do 
not intend to be they are perceived by powerful agents of 
social manipulation and domination to be so. Prophets have 
the capacity to penetrate the curtain of actuality that oppresses 
us and expose the possibilities that lie below. Prophets have 
the capacity to envision ethereal things, vague values and 
ends-in-view that are nonetheless capable of guiding 
humankind's future quests. 
Once again, without imagination it is impossible to be 
moral or free. Without imagination we are bound to the actual, 
to some existing state of affairs, to the way it is. With 
imagination we can envision alternatives to what is. Posses-
sion of alternatives introduces the possibility of free moral 
choice at the existentially most basic level. If we can see that 
the way it is now is not how it has to be, then we might de-
cide that the way it is now is not how it morally ought to be. 
We may then choose to act wisely, to call what is out of exist-
ence, and what ought to be, into existence. When Martin 
Luther King said he had a dream of racial equality, he was 
speaking poetically as a moral prophet naming a value that is 
even now only "half-known." King suffered the characteris-
tic fate of prophets whose poetic critique challenged actual 
conditions and sought to call into existence new social val-
ues. His social hope, however, still lives. 
Transformative teachers should appear as prophets to their 
students. Why they do not is easy to understand. Dewey 
continues on in the same paragraph where he speaks of moral 
prophets as poets to admit that, "Uniformly, however, their 
vision of possibilities has soon been converted into a 
proclamation of facts that already exist and hardened into 
semi-political institutions. Their imaginative presentation of 
ideas that should command thought and desire have been 
treated as rules of policy."23 Schools are perhaps the pre-
mier political institutions for reducing a child's visions of 
possibilities and alternative values that should command the 
passion of the Human Eros into mere rules of policy. Schools 
are valuable tools for the powerful agents of industry, union, 
and government to seize students and turn them to the ends 
of their hegemonic desires. Students are uncritically pro-
vided with a pre-interpreted creation taught according to a 
teacher-proof curriculum. Prophets and prophecy are replaced 
by profits. Students learn to value having more rather than 
being more. Technocratic micro-accountability, with its man-
tra of performance testing and outcomes assessment, serves 
to constrain the Human Eros. Suppressing that passionate 
desire for meaning, self-creation, and social expression is the 
greatest evil that schools perpetuate. 
As he drew toward the conclusion of Art as Experience. 
Dewey considered our ethical experience and declared, 
"Mankind is divided into sheep and goats, the vicious and 
virtuous, the law-abiding and criminal, the good and bad. To 
be beyond good and evil is an impossibility for man, and yet 
as long as the good signifies only that which is lauded and 
rewarded, and the evil that which is currently condemned or 
outlawed, the ideal factors of morality are always and every-
where beyond good and evil."24 Schools are excellent sort-
ing machines for separating sheep and goats, the law-abiding 
and criminal, the good and bad, according to rules of policy. 
That is what "tracking" does. But who has the power to cre-
ate the rules of policy? There are poets of hegemonic power. 
They passionately desire domination, that is their greatest 
good. Laws that allow only what such power prefers can 
come to define ordinary everyday good and evil. Their laws 
define the standard of morality and right conduct. They and 
those who abide by their rules are, by definition, the good. 
They create our curricula. The greatest irony of the dialectic 
of good and evil is that the moral prophet will almost always 
appear as the moral transgressor. In naming their visions of 
ethereal things, the possible beyond the actual that they feel 
ought to be, prophets almost always appear as outlaws. That 
is why transformative visionary teachers burn out or are 
thrown out so quickly. 
Dewey concluded Art as Experience by commenting on 
the following passage from Percy Bysshe Shelley. 
The great secret of morals is love, or a going out of our nature 
and the identification of ourselves with the beautiful which 
exists in thought, action, or person, not our own. A man (sic) 
to be greatly good must imagine intensely and comprehen-
sively.25 
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When we look at it now, we can easily read it as a concise 
and accurate statement of the existential meaning of educat-
ing the Human Eros in the ways of wisdom. The only thing 
Dewey added was a strong sense of community and a firm 
faith. It is an intricate education in the etymological sense of 
"leading forth," a love that desires the beautiful and the good 
with passionate devotion. The education of the Human Eros 
teaches a kind of meaningful action that is thoughtfully dis-
ciplined and faithfully pursued with fine and sudden reason-
ings. It is a poetic not a passive education that cultivates and 
enculturates imagination in its matriculants. 
When Dewey called for an education that freed the in-
telligence to reconstruct society, he was, I think, calling for 
the artistic and not merely aesthetic, education of the Human 
Eros. Let me end by affirming that I do not have any details 
of how the education of Eros might be carried out. The con-
versation, however, should get started. 
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